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ASIA’S RESPONSE TO THE U.S. INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY
This panel was convened at 9:00 a.m., Saturday, March 20, 2019, by its moderators, Weixia Gu
of the University of Hong Kong and Pasha Hsieh of the Singapore Management University, who
introduced the panelists: Ronald Eberhard Tundang of the Indonesian Embassy to the United
States; Matthew Erie of Oxford University; Julian Ku of Hofstra University School of Law; and
Inu Manak of the Cato Institute.
BUILDING THE RCEP: LEGAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS
doi: 10.1017/amp.2019.192
By Pasha L. Hsieh*
INTRODUCTION
The Trump administration declared the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) strategy as the new
U.S. policy on Asia in 2017. This new strategy will have far-reaching implications for U.S.-Asia
relations and global governance. The FOIP is conventionally perceived to focus on security
dimensions. By “free,” the United States expects all countries “to exercise their sovereignty free
from coercion by other countries.”1 The qualifier, “open,” is meant to refer to regional connectivity,
in particular including freedom of navigation.2 Notably, the economic dimensions of this
component also envision “fair and reciprocal trade” and “transparent agreements.”3
This roundtable organized by the ASIL-Law in the Pacific Rim Region Interest Group, centers
on Asia’s response to the FOIP from dispute resolution and trade perspectives. We seek to address
the following issues: What are Asian countries’ legal and political response to the U.S. agenda?
Howwill recent diplomatic developments of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
China, and India counter U.S. unilateralism? In a similar vein, how will Asia’s alternative strate-
gies, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Comprehensive and the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), shape international law and commercial
transactions?
Weixia Gu and Matthew Erie will shed light on the impact of the BRI on commercial courts and
arbitral institutions. Inu Manak will assess the renegotiations of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) and the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement. Ronald Eberhard Tundang will
explore ASEAN’s evolving internal integration into the ASEAN Economic Community. Julian
Ku will examine the role of Taiwan and South China Sea issues that are pertinent to the
* Associate Professor of Law and LeeKong Chian Fellow, SingaporeManagement University &Co-Chair, ASIL-Law in
the Pacific Rim Region Interest Group.
1 U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region,
at 4 (2019).
2 Id.
3 Id.
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Indo-Pacific strategy. Below, I analyze the development of the RCEP, which is expected to be the
world’s largest free trade agreement (FTA) without U.S. participation.
THE RCEP AS ASIAN POWERS’ STRATEGY
The sixteen-party RCEP includes major powers in the Asia-Pacific region and many of them,
such as Australia, India, and Japan, are key allies under the FOIP. Once it is launched, the
RCEP will cover half of the world’s population and 30 percent of global gross domestic product
(GDP), which is more than double that of the eleven-party Comprehensive and Progressive
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).4
China and Japan have vigorously vied for regional economic leadership since the 2000s. While
Beijing proposed the ASEAN+3 structure in 2001, Tokyo initiated the ASEAN+6 scheme in 2006.
To break the impasse and strengthen the concept of ASEAN centrality, the ten ASEAN countries
introduced the framework for “an ASEAN-led process” in 2011 and essentially merged the
Chinese and Japanese proposals.5 On the basis of the 2012 Guiding Principles for the RCEP, nego-
tiations commenced in 2013.6 As of March 2019, the RCEP parties have finalized seven out of
eighteen chapters and will finalize the pact by the end of 2019.7 Expediting RCEP talks not
only reflects Asian countries’ consensus to fast-track regional economic integration amid the
U.S.-China trade war, but also emphasizes their collective power to shape the international eco-
nomic order. As evidenced by the cooperation of ASEAN, China, and India, their trade policies
converged in the efficient conclusion of the RCEP as a prominent mega-regional trade agreement.
For ASEAN, its ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Blueprint 2025 places the RCEP as a key
priority. Instead of a “clean slate” approach, the RCEPwill coexist rather than replace current FTAs
and bilateral investment agreements between the parties. However, the RCEPwill fortify the bloc’s
hub status and help consolidate its bilateral FTAs with China, Japan, India, Korea, Australia, and
New Zealand. The RCEP and the AEC represent ASEAN’s intertwined external and internal inte-
gration and will galvanize the emergence of “ASEAN law” as a legal framework for new Asian
regionalism.8
China is the RCEP’s largest member, which accounts for one-third of the pact’s GDP. The RCEP
would complement China’s BRI that aims to facilitate the export of Chinese capital, labor, and
production. Trump’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2017 has enabled Beijing
to fill the power vacuum in Asia. This agreement will enhance Beijing’s right of discourse in global
rulemaking and enables it to gain additional leverage against Washington. Markedly, China’s
increasingly assertive stance on the RCEP is illustrated by its proposal to exclude India, which
has insisted on its conservative tariff elimination offers.9
4 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), at https://asean.org/?static_post=rcep-regional-comprehen-
sive-economic-partnership; Yasu Ota & Shuichi Maruyama, Ocean’s Eleven, NIKKEI ASIAN REV., at 16 (2018).
5 ASEAN Framework for Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (2011); Pasha L. Hsieh, Against Populist
Isolationism: New Asian Regionalism and Global South Powers in International Economic Law, 5 CORNELL J. INT’L L.
683, 691–95 (2018).
6 Guiding Principles and Objectives for Negotiating the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (2012).
7 Tham Siew Yean, Commentary: Concluding the High-Stakes RCEP in 2019 Will Need a Different Approach, CNA
(Mar. 16, 2019), at https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/commentary/concluding-high-stakes-rcep-2019-will-need-
different-approach-11336424.
8 Pasha L. Hsieh & BryanMercurio, ASEAN Law in the New Regional Economic Order: An Introductory Roadmap to the
ASEAN Economic Community, in ASEAN LAW IN THE NEW REGIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: GLOBALTRENDS AND SHIFTING
PARADIGMS, 3, 3–19 (Pasha L. Hsieh & Bryan Mercurio eds., 2019).
9 Amiti Sen, China Proposes ASEAN+3 Mega Free Trade Agreement Sans India, Australia and NZ, HINDU BUS. LINE
(May 26, 2019), at https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/china-proposes-ASEAN3-mega-free-trade-agree-
ment-sans-india-australia-and-nz/article27255349.ece.
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For India, the RCEPwill provide a critical opportunity for the country to integrate into the supply
chain of East Asia. The pact therefore directly contributes to Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Act
East policy, which adopted a more action-based approach over the preceding Look East policy. For
RCEP negotiations, New Delhi aims at increasing the provision of outbound professional services
while opposing the import of agricultural products and CPTPP-level intellectual property
standards.
THE RCEP AS A PATHWAY TO NEWASIAN REGIONALISM
In contrast with the FOIP that focuses on bilateral agreements, Asian countries have accelerated
the plurilateral approach to constructing new Asian regionalism. A substantive objective of new
Asian regionalism is evidenced in the Bogor Goals, which were set by Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) in 1994, to achieve “free and open trade and investment in the Asia-
Pacific” by 2020. In 2004, the APEC Business Advisory Council introduced a Free Trade Area
of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), which includes twenty-one APEC economies.
The 2010 APEC Leaders’ Declaration identified ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6, and the CPTPP as path-
ways to the FTAAP. The “ASEAN+” framework is the basis of the RCEP. In its 2014 Beijing
Roadmap, APEC declared the RCEP as a feasible pathway to the FTAAP for the first time.
Below, I identify selected features of the RCEP that distinguish it from those of the CPTPP and
other “Western” style FTAs. These features maymake the RCEP a preferable model for developing
countries to pursue the FTAAP in new Asian regionalism.
First, unlike most trade agreements that involved the United States and the European Union
(EU), the RCEP does not include chapters on state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and labor and envi-
ronmental protection.10 The exclusion of SOE provisions that require SOEs to behave like com-
mercial market actors is presumably important to developing countries because SOEs serve the
policy goal of maintaining employment and social stability. This exclusion particularly favors
China and Vietnam, which have relied on SOEs to drive their economic growth. Importantly,
the omission of labor and environment chapters also illustrate developing nations’ desire for avoid-
ing the trade-plus provisions that delay negotiations. These provision are often mandated by the
Global North to address social demands in their domestic politics but have yielded limited results
in developing countries.
Second, the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism has been criticized for transfer-
ring sovereignty tomultilateral corporations and creating a regulatory chill detrimental to the imple-
mentation of the public policy. It is financially and legally onerous for developing nations to handle
ISDS challenges. Given the resistant positions of certain RCEP countries, including India and
Indonesia, the ISDS under the RCEP will have a limited scope and will not be applied on a
most-favored-nation basis.11 Tellingly, the CPTPP also scales back the scope of ISDS by disallow-
ing investors to sue the host government on the basis of the investment agreement and by suspend-
ing theminimum standard of treatment pertinent to financial services. On a national level, countries
such as New Zealand further signed bilateral “side letters” to either exclude ISDS entirely or con-
dition arbitration on the government’s approval. Although the EU has promoted and included pro-
visions on the two-tiered investment court system in its agreements with Canada, Singapore, and
Vietnam, none of RCEP partners have considered adopting this system for regional agreements.
10 Outline of the RCEPAgreement (as of Nov. 2018), in Joint Leaders’ Statement on the Negotiations for the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).
11 Reduced Scope of Application of ISDS in RCEP; Negotiating Partners Still Aim at End-2018, INV. TREATY NEWS (Oct.
17, 2018), at https://www.iisd.org/itn/2018/10/17/reduced-scope-of-application-of-isds-in-rcep-negotiating-partners-still-
aim-at-end-2018.
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Finally, similar to the CPTPP, the RCEP contains an open accession clause. The CPTPP is open to
“any State or separate customs territory” after it becomes effective. The RCEP permits “any
ASEAN FTA partner” or “any other external economic partners” to join the agreement. Neither
pact elaborates specific conditions and procedures for accession. The term “separate customs ter-
ritory” is commonly understood to refer to Taiwan, officially the Republic of China. Taiwan and
the United Kingdom have indicated their interest in joining the CPTPP. As a result of conflicts with
Japan, strong political and business support for Korea to accede to the CPTPP is lacking.
Interestingly, as a CPTPP party, the Mahathir Mohamad government of Malaysia has now adopted
a more cautious stance and has yet to ratify the deal. For the RCEP, the 2017 ASEAN–Hong Kong
FTAmade China’s Special Administrative Region a potential RCEPmember. Chile and Peru, both
CPTPP and APEC members, are also considering applying for RCEP membership. The accession
of these countries to the RCEP will invigorate the Bogor Goals and provide a basis for this pact to
be a new trans-Pacific mega-regional.
CONCLUSION
The FOIP offers both challenges and opportunities to Asia. Various approaches adopted by
Asian countries, including the RCEP, demonstrate the collective response of Asian countries to
the legal and political uncertainty that arises from U.S. unilateralism. From a global perspective,
the RCEP will have a systemic impact on new Asian regionalism and world trade law. Its pro-
development design, principle of flexibility and the institutional mechanism will likely offer a
new model for the Global South to pursue economic integration.
THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION BUSINESS IN THE BELT
AND ROAD
doi:10.1017/amp.2019.193
By Weixia Gu*
INTRODUCTION
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) ambitiously aspires toward expanding regional markets
and facilitating economic integration across Asia and Europe.1 It has been regarded as a game-
changer on the landscape of dispute resolution market, triggering a proliferation of “adjudication
business.”2 This report examines the dynamics of international dispute resolution in context of the
BRI, discussed from the three following perspectives: (1) BRI investors and disputants; (2) three
major means of dispute resolution on offer; and (3) institutions involved.
BRI INVESTORS AND DISPUTANTS
In context of increased investment among Belt and Road nations, it is expected that BRI disputes
may involve participants from both states and private investors, and can broadly be classified in the
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Hong Kong.
1 People’s Republic of China National Development & Reform Commission Press Release, Visions and Actions on
Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (Mar. 28, 2015), at http://en.ndrc.gov.
cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html.
2 Pamela Bookman, The Adjudication Business, YALE J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2019), Temple University Legal Studies
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